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Regret-related brain activity is dependent on free choice, but it is unclear whether this activity is a function of
more subtle differences in the degree of responsibility a decision-maker exerts over a regrettable outcome. In this
experiment, we show that trial-by-trial subjective ratings of regret depend on a higher subjective sense of respon-
sibility, as well as being dependent on objective responsibility. Using fMRI we show an enhanced amygdala
response to regret-related outcomes when these outcomes are associated with high, as compared to low, responsibility.
This enhanced response was maximal in participants who showed a greater level of enhancement in their subjec-
tive ratings of regret engendered by an objective increase in responsibility. Orbitofrontal and cingulate cortex
showed opposite effects, with an enhanced response for regret-related outcomes when participants were not
objectively responsible. The findings indicate that the way the brain processes regret-related outcomes depends on
both objective and subjective aspects of responsibility, highlighting the critical importance of the amygdala.
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INTRODUCTION
Liberty means responsibility. That is why most men
dread it. (George Bernard Shaw, 1856–1950)
Good or bad events in our lives can invite a comparison
to what might have been, a psychological process
referred to as “counterfactual thinking.” Outcomes
that could have been better from the same choice tend
to induce feelings of disappointment, while outcomes
that could have been better from a different choice
induce feelings of regret (Roese & Olson, 1995). A
focus on this different choice, or a between-option
counterfactual comparison, invokes the idea that
regret depends on reproach, self-blame, and a desire
to have acted differently, whereas disappointment is
associated more with a sense of bad luck and/or power-
lessness (Zeelenberg et al., 1998b). While it has been
suggested that outcome regret can be experienced
without a feeling of self-blame (Connolly & Zeelenberg,
2002; Simonson, 1992), the dominant view is that
self-blame or responsibility is a necessary prerequisite
in the experience of regret (see Connolly, Ordónez, &
Coughlan, 1997; Ordonez & Connolly, 2000; and
Zeelenberg, van Dijk, & Manstead, 1998a, 2000 for a
thorough review and discussion).
Neurobiological studies provide compelling evid-
ence for a role of the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) in
regret. Patients with orbitofrontal cortex lesions do
not experience regret but show no impairment in
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experiencing disappointment (Camille et al., 2004).
Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI),
Coricelli et al. (2005) reported activity in medial OFC
associated with the experience of regretful outcomes
as well as amygdala activity associated with a ten-
dency to avoid choices that might engender regret.
Others report a greater role of the OFC in regret com-
pared to disappointment (Chua, Gonzalez, Taylor,
Welsh, & Liberzon, 2009), regret compared to relief
(Chandrasekhar, Capra, Moore, Noussair, & Berns,
2008), relative compared to absolute loss (Fujiwara,
Tobler, Taira, Iijima, & Tsutsui, 2008), and evaluat-
ing incorrect compared to correct choices (Lui et al.,
2007).
The role of agency in modulating brain activity
associated with choice outcomes has been highlighted
by findings that ventral striatal responses to absolute
losses and gains depend on agency over the causal
choice (Coricelli et al., 2005). We extended this finding
to show that ventral striatal responses to outcomes
that are relatively better or worse than what might
have been from commitment to a different choice also
depend on agency (Nicolle, Bach, Driver, & Dolan, in
press). However, self-blame regret involves more
than just agency over a choice, depending also on
social norms and decision justifiability (Connolly &
Zeelenberg, 2002). For example, it is likely to be the
case that we can more easily justify a bad decision,
thus reducing feelings of self-blame, if we know oth-
ers would have made a similar choice. Moreover, if
others actually played a part in the bad decision, self-
blame regret can be reduced by transferring a compo-
nent of responsibility onto them. The likely import-
ance of self-blame in regret led us to predict that
regret-related responses would be modulated by the
degree to which a decision-maker feels responsible
for an outcome. Thus, we designed an experiment
where participants experienced outcomes of “played”
and “unplayed” gambles under various levels of
responsibility (a task modified from a design of Mel-
lers, Schwartz, & Ritov, 1999). While the act of mak-
ing a choice between two gambles was constant
across all trials, our paradigm created situations where
participants’ actual experienced sense of responsibil-
ity for outcomes was systematically varied. The latter
manipulation was realized by informing participants
that each of their played gambles would depend on
their own choice along with the votes of varying num-
bers of additional individuals. Here, we predicted that
participants’ subjective sense of responsibility for
gamble outcomes would decrease as a function of
greater numbers of these “other voters.”
There are good grounds to expect an effect
of responsibility being expressed in brain regions
implicated in agency and motor control, including the
insula and angular gyrus (Farrer & Frith, 2002; Farrer
et al., 2003), although such regions are implicated
more in being responsible, as opposed to feeling
responsible. In relation to our central question we
predicted regret-related brain activity to be modu-
lated by the degree to which the outcome of the
played gamble is worse than that of the unplayed
gamble in regions previously implicated in regret
(including OFC, amygdala, hippocampus, ACC,
insula, and striatum), but only with higher levels of
responsibility.
METHODS
Participants
We recruited 18 participants (10 female) for the
experiment. All were right-handed with normal or
corrected vision, and no history of neurological
or psychiatric disorder. Participants’ ages ranged
between 19 and 30 years (mean = 23.67 years) and
each gave informed consent, according to procedures
approved by the UCL Research Ethics Committee.
Due to incomplete behavioral data collection, one
participant was removed from the behavioral analysis,
but included in the imaging analysis. A second partic-
ipant was removed from the imaging analysis due to
scanner malfunction, but was included in the behavioral
analysis. A further participant was excluded as
an outlier, after showing a relationship between
regret-related outcomes and subjective ratings of
regret that was 2.5 standard deviations from the mean
and negative.
Experimental procedure
Our central aim was to explore how subjective and
neuronal responses to regret-related outcomes are
modulated by responsibility. We used a task based on
that of Mellers et al. (1999). In brief, participants were
instructed to choose between two “wheel-of-fortune”
gambles on each trial, each incorporating a win and
loss outcome with differing probabilities (25%, 50%,
or 75%). We used 24 different gamble pairs, allowing
for four different pairs per probability combination
(e.g., 25% win against 50% win). Points allocated to
the possible winning and loosing outcomes were such
that the two gambles in the pair were of equal
expected value (EV) (i.e., probability of win × magni-
tude of possible win). In order to enhance feelings of
skill in the game, two further pair types made up 7%180 NICOLLE ET AL.
of trials and included one gamble of a clearly higher
EV than the other. Details of the gamble pairs used
are given in Table 1.
An exemplar trial timeline is shown in Figure 1.
Participants were told that their choice would count as
one vote towards the gamble to be played. In mini-
blocks of five trials, participants were informed that
they were playing in a group alongside 0, 2, 4, 6, or 8
other voters, whom they believed to have performed
the task in advance, but who were not real. After they
selected their preferred gamble, the gamble receiving
the highest number of votes from the group (including
their own vote) was played. With more than 0 other
voters, there was a chance that the played gamble
would not be congruent with the participant’s own
choice. The probability of participants’ chosen gamble
being played varied probabilistically as a function of
the number of voters, such that a greater number of
voters meant an increased chance that their gamble
would not be selected, while in situations of 0 other
voters their chosen gamble was always played. After
a 2 s delay, participants were then shown the points
outcome of both the played and the unplayed gamble.
The outcome of played gamble, whether congruent or
incongruent with their own gamble choice, deter-
mined payment for the experiment. If the played gamble
was incongruent with the participant’s own gamble
choice the lowest level of responsibility was pre-
dicted, as participants were not agents of the choice. If
the played gamble was congruent with the partici-
pant’s own gamble choice, however, we predicted
that participants’ subjective sense of responsibility for
gamble outcomes would decrease as a function of the
increased numbers of “other voters,” even though par-
ticipants were still the agents of the choice. Partici-
pants received 50p for each percentage they won of
the maximum points they could have won in their
game. This encouraged participants to compare the
received outcome with what might have been under
the unplayed gamble, on a trial-by-trial basis. Partici-
pants were assumed to treat all trials as having an
equal impact on their financial gain.
TABLE 1 
Details of the gamble pairs used in the task, including the probabilities of each of the winning and losing outcomes (in points) of 
each gamble option
Gamble 1 Gamble 2
Outcome 1 Probability 1 Outcome 2 Probability 2 Outcome 1 Probability 1 Outcome 2 Probability 2
18 0 0 . 5 −80 0.5 60 0.25 −20 0.75
21 0 0 . 5 −20 0.5 130 0.25 −50 0.75
37 0 0 . 5 −170 0.5 20 0.5 −120 0.5
43 0 0 . 5 −50 0.5 10 0.5 −30 0.5
55 0 0 . 5 −30 0.5 80 0.5 −60 0.5
61 5 0 0 . 5 −10 0.5 190 0.5 −50 0.5
71 6 0 0 . 5 −80 0.5 60 0.75 −20 0.25
84 0 0 . 5 −80 0.5 20 0.75 −140 0.25
97 0 0 . 5 −50 0.5 20 0.75 −20 0.25
10 200 0.5 −30 0.5 130 0.75 −50 0.25
11 50 0.5 −30 0.5 80 0.75 −200 0.25
12 50 0.5 −30 0.5 40 0.75 −80 0.25
13 120 0.25 −60 0.75 60 0.25 −40 0.75
14 10 0.25 −50 0.75 40 0.25 −60 0.75
15 100 0.25 −80 0.75 20 0.75 −200 0.25
16 80 0.25 −40 0.75 20 0.75 −100 0.25
17 140 0.25 −30 0.75 20 0.75 −50 . 2 5
18 20 0.75 −100 0.25 110 0.25 −50 0.75
19 60 0.75 −60 0.25 150 0.25 −10 0.75
20 60 0.75 −20 0.25 200 0.25 −10 0.75
21 100 0.75 −140 0.25 60 0.75 −20 0.25
22 100 0.75 −80 0.25 80 0.75 −20 0.25
23 10 0.75 −70 0.25 40 0.75 −160 0.25
24 80 0.75 −40 0.25 100 0.75 −100 0.25
25 150 0.5 0 0.5 0 0.5 −50 0.5
26 10 0.5 −200 0.5 200 0.75 −10 0.25
Gamble pairs 1–24 have equal expected value, i.e. (outcome 1 × probability 1) + (outcome 2 × probability 2). Gamble pairs 25 and 26 are
catch trials with noticeably different expected values.AMYGDALA AND SELF-BLAME REGRET 181
Participants performed both a behavioral session
and a scanning session, occurring on separate days
(order counterbalanced across participants). In the
behavioral session, participants played 320 trials in
four games and, after every trial, provided two subjec-
tive ratings on a 100-point horizontal visual analog
scale (this was not practical in the scanning session).
The starting position of the slider on each rating scale
was random between the extremes of 1 and 100, in
order to avoid anchoring effects. The rating questions
comprised either a memory probe asking “How much
bigger or smaller was the received gamble outcome
than what might have been received from the
unplayed gamble?” or a rating of subjective feeling
comprising the following probes, “How positive or
negative do you feel about the trial outcome?”, “How
much regret do you feel for outcome?”, and “How
responsible do you feel for the outcome?” It was ran-
domly decided which two of these four ratings would
be presented on each trial. We explained to partici-
pants that these ratings related to their response to the
outcome of each trial. Only the memory test, and not
the other ratings, was used during the scanning ses-
sion (in 10% of trials) in order to enhance the ten-
dency to think counterfactually. In the scanning
session, participants also played 320 trials in four
8-min games.
Imaging acquisition
We scanned participants in a 3 T Allegra scanner
(Siemens, Erlangen, Germany) operated with its stand-
ard head transmit–receive coil. The manufacturer’s
standard automatic 3D-shim procedure was per-
formed at the beginning of each experiment. Partici-
pants were scanned with a single-shot gradient-echo
planar imaging (EPI) sequence optimized to reduce
blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) sensitivity
losses in the orbitofrontal cortex due to susceptibility
artifacts, using a combination of increased spatial res-
olution in the readout direction and reduced echo time
(Weiskopf et al., 2007). Imaging parameters were as
follows: 48 oblique transverse slices tilted by 30°, res-
olution of 1.5 mm in the readout direction and 3 mm
in the PE direction, slice thickness = 2 mm, gap
between slices = 1 mm, repetition time TR = 3.12 s,
α = 90°, echo time TE = 25 ms, bandwidth (BW) =
1953 Hz/pixel, phase-encoding (PE) direction ante-
rior–posterior, field of view (FOV) = 192 × 192 mm2,
matrix size 128 × 64, z-shim gradient pre-pulse
moment = −1.4 mT/m × ms. EPI magnitude images
were reconstructed from the complex k-space raw
data using a generalized reconstruction method based
on the measured EPI k-space trajectory to minimize
ghosting (Josephs, Deichmann, & Turner, 2000). EPI
data acquisition was monitored online using a real-
time reconstruction and quality assurance system
(Weiskopf et al., 2007). We acquired fieldmaps for
each subject at the start of scanning (Siemens stand-
ard double echo gradient echo fieldmap sequence,
echo time = 12.46 ms, TR = 10.2 ms, matrix size = 64 ×
64, 64 slices covering the whole head, voxel size = 3 ×
3 × 3 mm). These allowed for calculation of static
geometric distortions caused by susceptibility-
induced field inhomogeneities, which were used to
correct EPI images for both these static distortions
and any changes in these distortions due to head
Figure 1. An exemplar trial timeline. Trials included a choice phase in which participants select their choice of gamble, with choice indicated
by a blue box. For each gamble, outcome probabilities were indicated by wedge size, with corresponding outcomes written above in number of
points. Number of other voters was also shown, but was constant for mini-blocks of 5 trials. A gamble selection stage followed, in which the
gamble receiving the highest number of votes was indicated with a yellow box. This gamble was then played, with its outcome affecting participants’
winnings whether chosen by them or not. Next, the outcome of both the played and the unplayed gambles was revealed.182 NICOLLE ET AL.
motion (Andersson, Hutton, Ashburner, Turner, &
Friston, 2001; Hutton et al., 2002). We also recorded
heart rate with a pulse oximeter, along with respira-
tory phase and volume using a breathing belt. At the
end of the scanning session, we acquired a T1-
weighted anatomical scan for each participant using a
modified driven equilibrium Fourier transform
(MDEFT) sequence (Ugurbil et al., 1993), with opti-
mized parameters as described in the literature (Deich-
mann, Schwarzbauer, and Turner, 2004): for each
volunteer, 176 sagittal partitions were acquired with an
image matrix of 256 × 224 (Read × Phase).
Analysis of subjective ratings
We operationalized “regret-related outcomes” as
those where the outcome of the played gamble
showed a negative discrepancy with (i.e., was worse
than) that of the unplayed gamble. Our design incor-
porated a continuous variable of this between-gamble
negative outcome discrepancy (i.e., received outcome –
foregone outcome). We predicted that subjective
ratings of regret (as well as negative affect) would be
enhanced with increasingly negative outcome dis-
crepancy. We also predicted that subjective ratings of
responsibility would decrease with increasing number
of other voters. Finally, we predicted that the relation-
ship between subjective regret and negative outcome
discrepancy would depend on both subjective and
objective measures of responsibility. We used linear
regressions to test for continuous relationships
between outcome discrepancy and subjective ratings
of regret and negative affect, since the independent
variables were on a continuous scale. To test the rela-
tionship between subjective responsibility, number of
voters, and choice congruence we used a repeated-
measures ANOVA. To assess our main hypothesis
that regret depends on choice responsibility, and its
degree, we tested a multiple regression model with
subjective regret ratings as the dependent variable.
The model entered as independent variables the out-
come discrepancy (from extreme positive to extreme
negative) along with the interaction of this discrep-
ancy with a measure of responsibility. For the latter,
we tested three distinct measures of responsibility
comprising subjective ratings of responsibility, choice
congruency, and the number of other voters. For
descriptive purposes, we also performed an ANOVA,
similar to that described above in the case of subjec-
tive responsibility, to test the relationship between
subjective regret and number of voters and choice
congruence for negatively discrepant outcomes only
(i.e., only for those outcomes objectively thought to
induce regret, rather than relief).
As we obtained multiple subjective ratings from
each participant along parametric continua of regret,
responsibility and negative feeling, these ratings were
standardized for each participant, to avoid anchoring
effects, and the standardized regression coefficients
for all analyses were calculated on an individual sub-
ject basis. We report mean standardized regression
coefficients from the between-subjects level of a hier-
achical linear model. Finally, with a one-sample t-test,
we tested whether participants’ answers on the post-
trial memory tests showed performance significantly
above chance. This enabled us to verify whether par-
ticipants were taking into account both the outcomes
received from the chosen and the alternative outcome
of the unchosen gamble on each and every trial.
Imaging processing and analysis
For fMRI, we used a two-variable parametric design,
with one factor for the number of other voters (0, 2, 4,
6, and 8 other voters), comprising our manipulation of
responsibility, and one factor for level of outcome dis-
crepancy, which ranged from −200 to +200 points.
This factor was transformed such that positive num-
bers were regret-related (i.e., negative outcome dis-
crepancy). An additional two-level factor was
expected to influence sense of responsibility, and
comprised whether a participant’s choice of gamble
was congruent or incongruent with the gamble
selected by the majority vote.
Image preprocessing and data analysis were imple-
mented using Statistical Parametric Mapping software
in Matlab2009a (SPM8; Wellcome Trust Centre for
Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, UCL). After
discarding the first six volumes of each run, to allow
for T1 equilibration, EPI images were corrected for
geometric distortions caused by susceptibility-
induced field inhomogeneities. Fieldmaps were proc-
essed for each participant using the FieldMap toolbox
implemented in SPM8 (Hutton, Deichmann, Turner,
& Andersson, 2004). The EPI images were then rea-
ligned and unwarped using SPM8 (Andersson et al.,
2001). Each participant’s structural image was coreg-
istered to the mean of the motion-corrected functional
images using a 12-parameter affine transformation,
and was segmented according to the standard proce-
dure in SPM8 (Ashburner & Friston, 2005). The spa-
tial normalization parameters resulting from the
previous step were then applied to the functional
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these images were smoothed using an 8 mm full
width, half maximum (FWHM) Gaussian kernel.
For each participant, we constructed an event-
related general linear model, including 9 regressors
of interest. These included one regressor for the
onsets of trial outcomes at each level of responsibility,
separated out as full responsibility (i.e., 0 other
voters), along with 2, 4, 6, and 8 other voters. Choice
trials in which there were more than 0 other voters
were further segregated as a function of whether par-
ticipants’ choices were congruent or incongruent,
with the gamble selected by the majority vote. In tri-
als with 0 other voters, participants’ choices were
always congruent with the gamble selected, as partic-
ipants were the only voter. Each of these 9 regressors
was parametrically modulated by a mean-corrected
regressor of outcome discrepancy. Positive values of
this parametric regressor were regret-related out-
comes (i.e., negatively discrepant). Onsets were mod-
eled with stick-functions at the time at which
participants received the outcome feedback, con-
volved with a canonical hemodynamic response
function and its temporal derivative. Motion parame-
ters defined by the realignment procedure were
entered as 6 regressors of no interest, along with 17
additional regressors of cardiac phase (10 regres-
sors), respiratory phase (6 regressors) and respiratory
volume (1 regressor).
We generated statistical parametric maps from
contrasts of interest including the main effect of
responsibility as measured by contrasts motivated by
effects of responsibility seen in the subjective ratings
results. Here, we were particularly interested in probing
activity within the regions of interest (ROIs) reported
by Farrer & Frith (2002), as involved in decreased
(the angular gyrus) and increased motor control (the
insula). As mentioned above, while these regions are
implicated in simple motor responsibility (or agency),
they may also be involved in processing variations in
blame based on how easily we can assign outcome
responsibility externally (of key importance for
decision justification models of regret; e.g., Connolly
& Zeelenberg, 2002). Next we tested the main effect
of negative outcome discrepancy (as a linear paramet-
ric effect) where we were interested in activity that
increased with greater levels of negative outcome dis-
crepancy independent of level of responsibility, as
well as (using a conjunction analysis) brain activity
that showed significantly increased response to nega-
tive outcome discrepancy across all levels of respon-
sibility. We tested for these effects within anatomical
ROIs in regions previously implicated in the experi-
ence of regret and regret-induced decision bias, including
OFC, anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), amygdala,
hippocampus, insula, and ventral and dorsal striatum
(all defined anatomically and bilaterally through the
WFU PickAtlas in SPM; Maldjian, Laurienti, Bur-
dette, & Kraft, 2003; Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002).
To address our hypotheses about how responses to
regret-related (i.e., negatively discrepant) outcomes
are modulated by responsibility we compared the
response to increasingly negative outcome discrep-
ancy under full responsibility (i.e., 0 other voters)
with that when other voters were present. Critically
this contrast was performed only on trials where the
participant’s own chosen gamble was played (i.e.,
congruent choice). Additionally, we compared
response to increasingly negative outcome discrep-
ancy under congruent choice vs. incongruent choice.
We implemented a group-level random-effects ana-
lysis using one-sample t-tests on the contrast images
obtained from each contrast of interest for each partic-
ipant. Within our regret-related ROIs, we report activ-
ity that survives family-wise error correction for
multiple comparisons at a voxel-level significance of
p < .05. For completeness, we also report any activity
that survives whole-brain cluster-wise corrected sig-
nificance of p < .05. All reported activity had a voxel-
level uncorrected significance of at least p < .001.
Behavioral results
A one-sample t-test confirmed that participants had
above-chance memory for whether the outcome
received from a played gamble was better or worse
than that which might have been received from the
unplayed gamble, as determined by post-trial memory
questions, t(15) = 15.09, p < .001, mean percent cor-
rect = 91.3%. This showed that participants were
aware of both the received and the unplayed alternat-
ive outcomes on each trial. Mean earnings were
£12.20 (SD £2.64) in the behavioral session, and
£22.43 (SD £2.67) in the scanning session.
We found a linear effect of number of voters on
subjective ratings of responsibility, F(1, 15) = 49.5,
p < .001, reflected in an increased sense of responsi-
bility with decreased number of other voters. The lin-
ear effect was also significant within congruent
choice trials alone, F(1, 15) = 24.0, p < .001, i.e.,
when participants had chosen the played gamble, but
not within incongruent choice trials, F(1, 15) = 0.6,
ns. We also found significant quadratic, F(1, 15) =
9.1, p < .01, and cubic, F(1, 15) = 5.6, p < .05, effects
of voters in the congruent choice condition. Partici-
pants showed significantly higher ratings of responsi-
bility for congruent than incongruent choice trials,
F(1, 15) = 46.9, p < .001 (Figure 2a, blue line).184 NICOLLE ET AL.
Single-subject standardized regression coefficients,
taken forward to a between-subject one-sample t-test,
showed that increasingly negative outcome discrep-
ancy significantly predicted greater subjective ratings
of regret, mean R = 0.52, t(15) = 8.04, p < .001. This
showed a successful manipulation of subjective regret
by outcome discrepancy. More negatively discrepant
outcomes also significantly predicted increased nega-
tive affect, mean R = 0.71, t(15) = 14.19, p < .001.
A multiple regression analysis indicated that
increased responsibility amplified the tendency for
participants to report high subjective feelings of regret
for outcomes with increasingly negative discrepancy.
That is, outcomes were rated as more regretful when
they were both more negative than what would have
been from the alternative gamble and when partici-
pants felt more responsible. The three regression
models used indicated that this effect was significant
for all three measures of responsibility; namely,
decreased number of voters, t(15) = 2.82, p < .02,
increased subjective ratings of responsibility, t(15) = 3.83,
p < .002, and choice congruency, t(15) = 3.29,
p < .005. The regression coefficients for the three
regression models are illustrated in Figure 2c. These
regression models were not restricted to negatively
discrepant outcomes (i.e., they include outcomes
objectively likely to induce relief, as well as regret),
and were performed using continuous functions of
subjective responsibility and outcome discrepancy.
To directly assess the direction of this effect on regret,
we show subjective regret for negatively discrepant
outcomes alone under different levels of objective
responsibility, as seen in Figure 2a, and under high
and low subjective responsibility in Figure 2b. We
found a linear effect of number of voters on subjective
ratings of regret for negatively discrepant outcomes,
Figure 2. (a) Gradually decreasing mean normalized ratings of subjective responsibility and of subjective regret under congruent and incon-
gruent choices with 0, 2, 4, 6, and 8 other voters, otherwise considered objective responsibility. For clarity, subjective regret ratings here are
shown only for negatively discrepant outcomes, i.e., where the outcome of the played gamble was worse than the outcome of the unplayed
gamble. (b) The mean normalized subjective ratings of regret, displayed as a binary separation of low and high subjective responsibility, for
negatively discrepant outcomes. (c) The mean regression coefficients for the three regression models used, each indicating that the predictive
value of outcome discrepancy (Odiff) on subjective ratings of regret is greatly enhanced by multiplying this Odiff by one of the three measures
of responsibility (number of voters, subjective rating of responsibility, or choice congruence). Error bars show the standard error of the mean
across participants.
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F(1, 15) = 18.7, p < .001, reflected in increased
regret with decreased number of other voters. The
linear effect was significant within congruent choice
trials alone, F(1, 14) = 6.8, p < .05; i.e., when partic-
ipants had chosen the played gamble, but not within
incongruent choice trials, F(1, 14) = 0.3, ns. Partici-
pants also showed significantly higher ratings of
regret for congruent than incongruent choice trials,
F(1, 15) = 30.7, p < .001 (Figure 2a, red line), and
for high compared to low subjective responsibility,
t(13) = 4.5, p < .001 (Figure 2b).
FMRI results
Manipulation of responsibility
We examined the effect of linearly decreasing
responsibility, following the pattern shown in Figure 2a.
While no areas showed a significant effect of increasing
responsibility, we found significant corrected level
effects in superior frontal cortex (MNI 51, 26, 31),
brainstem (MNI 0, −34, −26) and left insula (−45, 14,
−8) for decreasing responsibility. In our a priori ROIs,
right angular gyrus activity (within a 20 mm sphere
radius of the coordinates reported by Farrer & Frith,
2002) significantly increased with decreasing respon-
sibility (MNI 57, −43, 34), as did bilateral insula
(MNI right 30, 20, −11 and left −45, 14, −8). No
regions dissociated, at the time of outcome, between
played gambles that were congruent or incongruent
with the participant’s own choice, at a whole-brain
corrected level. However, right insula activity showed
such an effect within our a priori ROI of bilateral
insula (MNI 30, 20, −14).
Manipulation of regret
Averaged across all levels of responsibility we
found significantly increased activity as outcomes
became linearly more negatively discrepant in left
angular gyrus and lateral OFC (Figure 3a). Activity in
our other a priori ROIs, in the amygdala, hippocampus,
ACC, and insula, did not show this effect. Crucially, no
regions showed responsibility-invariant responses to
negatively discrepant outcomes, as evident in a con-
junction analysis, providing evidence against a neural
representation of a purely outcome-based form of
regret. Instead, regret-related responses in angular
gyrus and lateral OFC appeared to be dependent on the
level of responsibility. However, it is important to note
that the reduced power inherent in such a conjunction
analysis means that we cannot reject the null hypothe-
sis that such responsibility-invariant responses do exist.
To address whether activity associated with nega-
tive outcome discrepancy is modulated by level of
responsibility, we restricted the analysis to congruent
choice trials, i.e., where the participant’s chosen gam-
ble was played. This was justified on the basis that
negatively discrepant outcomes received in incongru-
ent choice trials were associated with participants
actually having been the agents of the post-hoc better
choice. Within a priori anatomical ROIs implicated in
regret, we found no regions showing an entirely linear
enhanced response to more negatively discrepant out-
comes by decreased number of other voters (i.e.,
increased responsibility). However, in keeping with
the marked step-like decrease in rated responsibility
from 0 to 2 or more other voters (shown in Figure 2a),
we found that left amygdala activity was enhanced for
more negatively discrepant outcomes during full
responsibility trials, and not when there were any
number of other voters (Figures 3b and 3c) (within
anatomically specified bilateral ROI of the amy-
gdala). A linear interaction of outcome discrepancy
and responsibility (within congruent choice trials)
was seen in right amygdala activity but only in partic-
ipants who showed a greater enhancement of subjec-
tive regret by responsibility (in the form of decreased
numbers of other voters) in the separate behavioral
session (Figure 3d), an effect also seen in left amy-
gdala at a trend level of significance.
By contrast, activity in middle cingulate cortex and
angular gyrus showed an increased response to more
negatively discrepant outcomes, when the played
gamble was incongruent (whole-brain cluster cor-
rected p < .05), compared to when it was congruent
with the participant’s own choice. This indicates a
role of middle cingulate cortex and angular gyrus in
the processing of regret-related outcomes that are
externally enforced. Furthermore, activity in middle
cingulate cortex, left angular gyrus, and lateral OFC
responsive to average effect of regret-related out-
comes (Figure 3a) showed a greater response to more
negatively discrepant outcomes on these incongruent
trials compared to congruent trials (although this was
only at p < .005 uncorrected level for the lateral
OFC). This indicates that regret-related activity in
these regions is not associated with self-blame.
DISCUSSION
In agreement with previous research (e.g., Zeelenberg
et al., 1998b), we found that subjective ratings of
regret depend both on the outcome being worse than
what might have been and on having a sense of
responsibility. We now provide new evidence that186
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subjective regret depends on the level of subjective
responsibility even though the individual’s own
choice or action directly contributed to the regret-
related outcome (as in the case of congruent trials).
These findings indicate that regret is not just a func-
tion of being an agent of a choice but also depends on
subtle changes in sense of responsibility, or accounta-
bility, for the outcomes of our actions. In keeping
with these behavioral effects we found that regret-
related neuronal activity in the amygdala was
enhanced by increased responsibility, suggesting a
critical role in “self-blame regret.” This effect was
magnified in participants who displayed a greater
enhancement of their subjective ratings of regret by
responsibility. Interestingly, we did not find any brain
regions responding to what has been termed “outcome
regret,” i.e., showing invariant responses to regret-
related outcomes under all levels of responsibility.
This suggests that, as for the psychological experience
of regret, the way the brain processes regretful events
may crucially depend on a sense of responsibility.
The human amygdala is known to be important in
emotional memory (Cahill, Babinsky, Markowitsch,
& McGaugh, 1995; Richardson, Strange & Dolan,
2004; Strange & Dolan, 2004) and in learning stimu-
lus–reward associations (e.g., Buechel, Morris,
Dolan, & Friston, 1997; Gottfried, O’Doherty, &
Dolan, 2003; LaBar, Gatenby, Gore, LeDoux, &
Phelps, 1998; Whalen et al., 2004). A model of amy-
gdala function in our study relates to its putative role
as a “relevance detector” (Sander, Grafman, & Zalla,
2003; Bach et al., 2008). This proposes that the amy-
gdala is involved in focusing attentional and physio-
logical resources towards cues that have special
relevance for personal safety or success. Amygdala
activation is found in socially relevant situations, such
as viewing untrustworthy or novel faces (Winston,
Strange, O’Doherty, & Dolan, 2002; Wright, Martis,
Schwartz, Shin, Fischer, McMullin, et al., 2003) when
following eye gaze (Kawashima et al., 1999), as well
as for especially self-relevant situations, as when
hearing one’s own name being presented during sleep
(Portas et al., 2000). Moreover, the amygdala is impli-
cated in biasing future decisions based on previous
regret (Coricelli et al., 2005), emphasizing its import-
ance in goal-directed motivation. Regret associated
with high responsibility is an experience with particu-
lar self-relevance, while also providing a strong moti-
vation for future behavior, such as motivating active
attempts to (or intentions to) undo unpleasant events
(Zeelenberg et al., 1998b; Zeelenberg & Pieters,
1999). On the other hand, a failure to appropriately
accept responsibility for our mistakes may interfere
with learning accurate associations between our
actions and their outcomes, which are vital in adapting
future behavior. Specifically self-relevant information
may be passed to the amygdala from other task-engaged
cortical regions (for example, we have shown informa-
tion about responsibility and between-option outcome
comparisons to be associated with activity in the angu-
lar gyrus and prefrontal cortex), in order to allocate pro-
cessing resources to control mechanisms driving
adaptive behavior. In keeping with such a framework,
there is good evidence that the amygdala imparts
information necessary for acquiring stimulus–reward
associations to the OFC, which uses this information to
guide behavior (Pickens et al., 2003; Arana et al., 2003;
Schoenbaum, Gottfried, Murray, & Ramus, 2007),
allowing for behavioral flexibility in accordance with
strategic goals (Morris & Dolan, 2004).
The possibility of medial–lateral differences of
OFC involvement in regret is worthy of discussion.
While the null effect in the medial OFC does not chal-
lenge the role of medial OFC involvement in the self-
blame component of regret, it is surprising that we
find lateral OFC involvement in negatively discrepant
outcomes without responsibility. It is possible that this
lateral OFC response reflects anger, frustration, or
loss of control in the participant, on the realization
that the other voters contributed to a bad outcome for
the group. On the other hand, it may reflect the partic-
ipant’s rejoicing associated with the knowledge that
they made the better choice on these incongruent
trials, despite the received outcome being aversive.
Our finding of strong negative affect associated with
low responsibility in our task, along with reports that
lateral OFC processes the unpleasantness of external
stimuli (e.g., Anderson et al., 2003), support the
former view. It is further possible that any medial
OFC response associated with self-blame may have
been overshadowed by more lateral OFC involvement
in such externally attributed negative emotions.
Understanding the role of subjective responsibility
and blame in regret may help in formulating therapies
for painful and debilitating life regrets. An ability to
externally shift responsibility for our bad choices can
reduce feelings of regret (Zeelenberg & Pieters,
2007), while understanding that others have made
similarly bad choices can provide justification for our
actions by placing us within the social norm
(Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002). On the other hand,
ability to accept responsibility for our actions can
motivate adaptive future behaviors, leading to long-
term improvements in quality of life. In real-life
decision-making, anticipating future regret has positive
influences on decisions in sexual behavior (e.g., Richard,
Van der Pligt, & de Vries, 1996), consumer choices
(e.g., Inman & Zeelenberg, 2002; Tsiros & Mittal,188 NICOLLE ET AL.
2000), and health-related choices (e.g., Lechner, de
Vries, & Offermans, 1997). Reb (2008) also found
that anticipating regret can improve the quality of the
decision process by increasing vigilance and careful-
ness. Furthermore, decision-making in areas of busi-
ness, politics, the legal world, health care, and
personal relationships may also be improved by the
ability to effectively anticipate levels of self-blame.
In summary, we show that in the amygdala—a
region important in gathering personally relevant
information, in forming stimulus–reward associa-
tions, and in guiding future behavior—responses to
outcomes that could have been better from a different
choice are enhanced by responsibility, even when a
free choice has been made, highlighting a particular
role of the amygdala in the self-blame component of
our experiences of regret.
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